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DEFAULT JUDGMENTS AGAINST CONSUMERS:
HAS THE SYSTEM FAILED?
HILLARD M. STERLING* AND PHILIP G. SCHRAG**
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional conceptual model of an ordinary civil lawsuit is sim-
ple. A person who believes that he or she has a legitimate claim can file
an action. The defendant is given notice of the claim and an opportu-
nity to be heard, with the help of a lawyer, in the court in which the suit
was filed. A neutral judge decides the case, based on the evidence
presented. Most cases actually result in negotiated settlements,' but
these settlements presumably reflect the relative strengths of each side's
case as perceived by the parties. By appearing in court or negotiating,
defendants participate in the process; relatively few of them lose cases
by virtue of not showing up and allowing default judgments to be en-
tered against them.
2
In 1974, Professor David Caplovitz showed that this model is not an
accurate description of what happens to installment plan consumers of
goods and services who are sued by their creditors. His book, Consumers
in Trouble,3 is primarily a study of why consumers fail to make required
payments on installment obligations 4 and what happens to them as a
result of subsequent judicial intervention, 5 but Caplovitz devoted an im-
portant chapter to the role of courts in the collection process.
6
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1986, Northern Illinois Univ.;J.D.
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** Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Applied Legal Studies, Ge-
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1. In the federal system, only 5% of all civil cases are tried. R. COVER, 0. Fiss ANDJ.
RESNIK, PROCEDURE 198 (1988).
2. In the Superior Courts of Maine and Delaware, respectively, approximately 3 and
15% of civil cases end in defaultjudgments. STATE OF MAINE, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 90 (1988); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DELAWARE JUDICIARY 79 (1983).
3. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974)
[hereinafter CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE].
4. According to Caplovitz' study, the consumers' problems (such as sudden loss of
income or major illness) were the primary reason for the default 79% of the time, but 21%
of the defaults may have been triggered by some event that implicated the creditor, such as
fraud or a payment dispute. Id. at 53.
5. The efforts by creditors (including wage garnishment) to collect consumer install-
ment debts often cause the debtors to experience health and marital problems, id. at 280-
89, and in some cases (about 8%) lead to the loss of ajob. Id. at 237-42. 15 U.S.C. § 1674
(1988) prohibits firing a worker for a single garnishment, but employees can still be termi-
nated by employers who do not wish to incur the processing costs associated with succes-
sive garnishments.
6. Id. at 191-224.
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Caplovitz' researchers interviewed 1038 consumers who had been
sued (in approximately equal numbers) in Chicago, Detroit, and New
York. 7 According to the debtors, 8 only 71% of them actually received
notice that they were being sued. 9 Among the 71% who received sum-
monses, only a small minority filed the requisite answer to defend
against the merchant's complaint: 8 to 9% in Chicago, 7 to 9% in De-
troit, and 1 to 8% in New York City.' 0 In all of the other cases, the
defendants lost judgments by default.
Thus, in cases against consumers, at least in major cities, fewer than
10% of the defendants made an effort to defend themselves. But this
fact is not necessarily cause for alarm. It is theoretically possible that
most of the consumers who default' do so quite deliberately because
they know that they lack any valid defenses and would only be wasting
their time in court. Indeed, for this very reason "a number of judges in
these courts" are not troubled that their tribunals impose default judg-
ments on more than 90% of consumer defendants.
12
Unfortunately, Caplovitz did not address the question of whether
the default rate in consumer cases is merely a manifestation of consum-
ers' accurate understanding that they lacked defenses or whether it rep-
resents a failure of justice. An approach to this problem requires
analysis of whether the defaulting consumers had defenses to the claims
that they waived, knowingly or inadvertently, by failing to appear. But
only three of Caplovitz' 164 questions were likely to elicit information
about possible defenses.' 3 The three pertinent questions were: "1.
[w]hat were the main reasons you stopped making payments on the mer-
7. Id. at 195, 323-29.
8. The debtors were interviewed long after the court cases against them had been
closed; they had little incentive to lie to the interviewers. Much of what they reported is
consistent with the findings of other researchers. For example, on the common practice,
especially in New York City, of not giving actual notice to consumer defendants, and ob-
taining default judgments based on perjured affidavits of service, see Tuerkheimer, Service
of Process in New York City: A Proposed End to Unregulated Criminality, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 847
(1972).
9. There was some variation among the three cities, with 84% and 71% of debtors
reporting actual service in Detroit and Chicago (where court officials served process) and
only 54% in New York City (where service of process is accomplished by private individu-
als or companies). CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 194-95.
10. In each case, the first figure represents the percentage reported by Caplovitz as
filing answers (in all three cities, a prerequisite to avoiding a default), and the second
figure represents the percentage reported as outcomes other than default judgments (e.g.,
voluntary discontinuances). At first blush it is difficult to understand how the number of
non-defaults could ever be higher than the number of non-answers, but some of the credi-
tors in the sample may have withdrawn some cases notwithstanding the defendants' de-
faults. This could have occurred if they did not know about the defaults; settled with the
consumers after the defaults and before they registered default judgments; or conscien-
tiously corrected errors that had resulted in filing suits against people who had already
paid in full. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 215-21.
11. The word "default" can have two meanings in connection with consumer install-
ment debts. It can refer to a default in payment on the underlying contractual obligation
or to a failure to appear in person or through a representative in court. This article uses
the term in the latter sense.
12. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 205.
13. Id. at 331-47 (survey questionnaire).
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chandise [or] loan; 2. [d]id they call or threaten to call any of your
friends or relatives about this debt;14 and 3. [d]o you think there was a
good reason that you should not have had to pay this debt?" Caplovitz'
interviewers were not told what reasons constituted "good" reasons,
and since many defenses to creditors' claims are technical,' 5 there is no
reason to think that the consumers themselves would have known what
constituted a good defense.
Although we lacked the means 16 to answer definitively the question
that Caplovitz' book raised, we set about to conduct a pilot study, using
a small data base, that could help to determine whether a more thor-
ough inquiry would be warranted. Our goal was to construct a sophisti-
cated questionnaire to probe any possible defenses that installment
credit consumers might have, and to administer it to consumers against
whom default judgments had been entered in small claims cases in the
District of Columbia.
Doing research on consumer defaults in the District of Columbia
enabled us, fortuitously, to inquire into a second issue raised by
Caplovitz' study. In all three cities in which his research was conducted,
a consumer was declared in default if he or she failed to appear in per-
son to file an answer to the summons and complaint.17 Caplovitz hy-
pothesized that some significant fraction of the defaults were
attributable to the fact that defendants were required to appear in court
on two different occasions, once to file the answer and once for the
trial. 18 Not only did this procedure require an employed defendant to
miss work twice, but it gave court clerks an opportunity to counsel de-
fendants not to file answers that the clerks believed, accurately or not,' 9
to be legally inadequate.2 0  Caplovitz also thought that defendants
might have had difficulty answering summonses because the language of
a summons, explaining the obligation to answer, was inordinately con-
fusing. In New York, for example, the text of the summons consisted of
two sentences, respectively 91 and 96 words long.
14. Collection harassment could warrant a counterclaim in some states. See generally
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAw CENTER, DEBT COLLECTION HARASSMENT (1982).
15. For example, a consumer has a valid counterclaim against a creditor if the contract
does not include, on its face, the annual percentage rate of the finance charge. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1638 (1988). Some defenses, such as unconscionability, are defined largely by case law
and therefore are not described explicitly even in the statute books.
16. Caplovitz' research was made possible. by a "generous" grant from the federal
Office of Economic Opportunity, which failed to survive the dismantling of President
Johnson's war on poverty. Even so, Caplovitz' study "exceeded the limits of the OEO
grant" and required a second grant, from the National Institute of Mental Health, for its
completion. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at xiii.
17. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 201, 215.
18. At the time of his study, defending a case for more than $200 in Chicago could
actually require three or four personal appearances.
19. Caplovitz' researchers interviewed some clerks in New York; they did not regard a
defense of "the price was too high" to be valid, despite the emerging doctrine of uncon-
scionability based on excessive price. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 202; Jones
v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (S.Ct., Nassau Co. 1969).
20. In New York, the clerks discouraged one out of every three or four defendants
from filing an answer. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 203.
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In the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia, where cases against consumers for less than
$2000 are heard, no written answer is required. Unlike the procedure in
all three of the cities studied by Caplovitz, the District of Columbia's
summonses merely tell a consumer to appear in court on a specific date
for the trial of the case. We were curious to know whether this stream-
lining of the system dramatically reduced the frequency with which con-
sumers suffered default judgments.2 1 If it turned out that despite this
relatively simple procedural system, consumers continued to default in
large numbers, we wanted to know what accounted for their failure to
appear for trials.
This article reports our findings. The first section describes our re-
search method and the characteristics of the small sample of consumers
in our study. The second section reports what we learned about why
those consumers stopped making the payments required by their install-
ment obligations, and why they defaulted in the litigation initiated
against them. The third section describes what we learned from these
defendants, and in some instances from independent verification, about
their possible defenses. The final section summarizes our findings and
suggests that if they are confirmed by studies of larger samples of de-
fendants, certain procedural reforms may be warranted. The Appendix
includes the text of our questionnaire, which we are putting in the public
domain for use by any scholar who wishes to use our questions or a
similar set of inquiries to survey another sample of consumers.
II. RESEARCH METHOD AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
A. Parameters of the Study
At the outset, we decided to restrict our study to judgments entered
in the Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia ("Small Claims Court"), which has jurisdiction
over cases not in excess of $2000.22 Some claims against consumers,
particularly those involving large balances on automobile purchases, are
processed in the civil division of the superior court, but the Small Claims
Court hears the vast majority of such cases. About 80% of the cases in
the Small Claims Court are against individual defendants, and about
80% of those defendants are consumers.
2 3
21. From our first visit to the court, we suspected that it did not reduce the number of
default judgments entered. The daily calendar call consists of well over a hundred cases.
In what seems like a majority of them, when the clerk calls the case, an attorney (one of
three or four who sit in what seems a privileged area, behind the bar that separates court
officials from the public) announces his or her readiness, the clerk pauses to hear whether
the defendant is present, the attorney says, "judgment, please" and the clerk enters judg-
ment. But since the court hears small commercial and tort cases as well as cases against
consumers, it was not possible without a more careful perusal of court records to deter-
mine whether most installment credit collection proceedings ended in default judgments.
22. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1321 (1981).
23. Telephone interview of Oliver Corbin, Clerk of the Small Claims and Conciliation
Branch, by Hillard Sterling (Mar. 21, 1989).
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To define a "consumer" defendant more precisely, we limited our
sample to cases that were consumer transactions under local law. Each
case had to involve a purchase that was "primarily for personal, house-
hold, or family use."' 2 4 We excluded several kinds of atypical cases of
purchases of consumer services: suits by doctors and hospitals 25 cases
in which the defendant maintained an open account with the plaintiff,2 6
and suits by financial institutions other than finance companies. 27
For our preliminary determination of the percentage of suits against
consumers that ended in default judgments, we applied these criteria to
a random sample2 8 of all 29,100 cases filed in the Small Claims Court
during 1988. Two hundred eighty-seven files of suits against consumers
were selected. 29 Two hundred thirteen of them (74%) had resulted in
default judgments. In another sixty-three cases (22%), the defendant
had appeared in court but had consented to pay everything asked for by
the plaintiff. In eleven cases (4%), the plaintiff had voluntarily dis-
missed the case. Of the 287 files sampled, none had resulted in a trial.3 0
24. D.C. CODE ANN. § 38-3901(a)(2) (1981).
25. It would have required a completely different questionnaire to try to ascertain
facts surrounding conflicts about medical practices or billing. Caplovitz' study also ex-
cluded suits by hospitals and other health care providers. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra
note 3, at 325.
26. Such cases typically involve a series of transactions over a long period of time,
rather than a particular sale of merchandise or services. It would have been inordinately
difficult for us to have untangled the webs of grievances that could inhere in such disputes.
Caplovitz eliminated from his study people who were being sued on "charge accounts"
but partially included "department stores such as Macy's and Gimbel's ... since they offer
revolving credit to their customers." Id. The distinction between "charge accounts" and
department stores' revolving credit is not clear to the authors. In any event, Caplovitz
deliberately "undersampled the non-elite department store cases by eliminating half of
them." Id.
27. Banks and other direct lending institutions were excluded because simple loans of
money do not typically implicate particular purchases of goods or services. Finance com-
panies were included, however, because their loans are often intrinsic aspects of particular
purchases. Finance companies commonly purchase contracts that have been entered into
between merchants and consumers. Finance companies were plaintiffs in 30 of the 72 files
examined for the purpose of locating interviewees; the other 42 plaintiffs were retail
merchants.
28. Cases are filed sequentially. Every hundredth case was pulled. If it met the crite-
ria, it was included in the sample. If it did not, the prior case was examined, or the one
before that, until a case which fit the criteria was found.
29. Four lots of 100 cases included no case that met the criteria. Some large-volume
plaintiffs whose suits fell outside of this study (hospitals and open-account plaintiffs) some-
times file dozens or even hundreds of suits on a single day, causing more than 100 files in a
row to be ineligible for consideration by this study.
30. The lack of trials is consistent with Caplovitz' study, which concluded that only 7
of the 311 Chicago defendants, at most 11 of the 395 Detroit defendants, and none of the
332 New York defendants had gone to trial. CONSUMERS IN IROUBLE, supra note 3, at 216-
20. Caplovitz suggests that the reason for the absence of trials is that "when the debtor
does appear for a trial, he is usually summoned to the bench by the judge, who is anxious
to clear his calendar, and is told to go out into the hall and work out a settlement with the
plaintiff's lawyer. In this fashion, even debtors with valid defenses are pressured to make
some payment." Id. at 218-19. One of us (Schrag) has observed dozens of calendar calls
at the Small Claims Court and has observed that they invariably begin with a speech by the
judge to the dozens of parties who are personally present. The judge points out that if
each of them wanted to have a trial, they could not do so that day, and that many of them
would have to come back on one or more successive days; some days, the judge even says
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While the default judgment rate was lower than that in other cities,
it was still substantial. The more elaborate part of our study required
selecting certain files for personal interviews with the defendants. Still
applying the definitional criteria of what constitutes a "consumer" case,
we applied two additional exclusionary tests in order to draw a sample
for interviews. We excluded from the study certain defendants who
would be too difficult to contact personally: those who had no tele-
phone listing in the documents that had been filed in court,3 ' and the
few who lived outside of the District of Columbia.3 2 Applying these ex-
clusions, a new sample of seventy-two files was drawn.
33
It was impossible to reach fifty-two of the seventy-two consumers
identified through this process. Many of them had no discoverable tele-
phone number, even when the court files listed numbers that were pur-
portedly theirs. Thirteen of the twenty-eight consumers for whom the
court records showed places of employment no longer worked at those
jobs, and had not left forwarding addresses. Of the twenty consumers
who were found, five refused to be interviewed.
A lengthy questionnaire, reproduced in the Appendix, was adminis-
tered to each of these fifteen remaining consumers. Eleven of the inter-
views were conducted in person by one of us (Sterling), and eight of the
interviewees agreed to permit a tape recording of the sessions.3 4 The
average interview lasted approximately fifty minutes.
The questionnaire was designed to incorporate questions testing
the applicability to the consumer's transaction of all of the major con-
that his or her calendar is already full that day, making trials impossible for anyone in the
room. The calendar call is inevitably followed by dozens of hallway conferences.
31. We determined that visits without prior telephone contact would not be produc-
tive. Nevertheless, one of us (Sterling) did try to visit personally 32 of the consumers in
the survey who lacked telephones. None of these attempts resulted in an interview. Sev-
enteen of the consumers were not home on more than two occasions, and although a
family member took a message for eight of.them, none telephoned him in response. The
other 15 consumers were said not to be living at the address listed for them in the court
files.
By contrast, most consumers who were initially contacted by telephone were willing to
be interviewed in person; eleven of the fifteen who were interviewed met with Sterling,
and the other four were interviewed entirely by telephone.
It was possible to find telephone numbers for those interviewed in the court records
because some creditors attached the original contract papers (sometimes including the
consumer's phone number) to the complaint; others wrote a number (taken from the con-
sumer's credit application) on the instructions for service of process which were later filed;
and some had, after judgment, obtained orders garnisheeing the wages of the defendant at
a place of employment specified on those orders.
32. By definition, we also excluded from the study any consumer against whom a final
judgment by default had not been entered.
33. In order to select cases spread over a fairly long period of time (to eliminate aber-
rations based on filings in a particular month or year), every 552d case out of the 82,800
cases filed in 1986, 1987 and 1988 was examined. As in the other sample, supra note 28, if
that case did not meet the criteria for study the prior file was examined, and, working
backward through the clerk's drawer, the first case in each block meeting the criteria was
pulled.
"Pulled" literally describes the process. A practical problem was the sheer physical
difficulty of reaching the files and tugging them from shelves that often squeezed them like
a vise.
34. The other four interviews were done by telephone.
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sumer protection statutes and common law rules of the District of Co-
lumbia. It was impossible, of course, to determine whether the
defaulting consumers would have won their cases, even if they did have
defenses under these laws, but we did want to find out whether they
appeared to have had good faith defenses that they did not know about,
did not believe would suffice, or waived for other reasons. In addition,
the questionnaire was intended to probe why the consumers chose not
to go to court.
35
B. Qualifications Based on Methodology
Before we report on what we learned from administration of this
questionnaire, a few notes qualifying our results are in order. The au-
thors recognize that this work cannot produce a definitive assessment of
the default judgment process. The number of people actually inter-
viewed is too low to support hard conclusions about the entire system.
In addition, the exclusion of consumers who lacked discoverable tele-
phone numbers may have biased the survey in favor of relatively wealth-
ier defendants, and the exclusion of defendants with open accounts may
have caused our sample to under-represent those with the most rela-
tively stable purchasing habits. 36 Most important, one creditor plaintiff
was surely over-represented in the sample by virtue of the fact that its
files provided information that better enabled us to find its defendants.
Associated Finance Company ("AFC") 3 7 instituted debt collection ac-
tions against consumers on contracts purchased from various
merchants. Within its complaints, AFC routinely provides information
about the defendant, including home addresses and all known phone
numbers. Also, AFC is one of the few plaintiffs that persistently exe-
cutes on its judgments by seeking wage garnishments. Since the writs of
attachment contain the defendants' places of employment, we could eas-
ily contact those consumers by calling them at work. Thus, even though
no express effort was made to select AFC cases, ten of the fifteen con-
sumers interviewed were sued by AFC. The bias that this over-represen-
tation of AFC might introduce is reduced somewhat by the fact that the
contracts on which it sued arose from transactions between consumers
and five different merchants - four general retailers and one door-to-
door seller. On the other hand, as we elaborate below, one of our find-
ings is that defendants sometimes default because the plaintiff advises
them not to go to court. Since several consumers reported that AFC
gave such advice, and this behavior is unrelated to the identity of the
35. See Appendix, questions 122-44.
36. In addition, the fact that the imposition of garnishment orders helped to locate
several defendants may have produced a sample of persons with a higher rate of employ-
ment than the population of defaulting consumers in general.
37. The name of this company and its attorney have been changed because, although
several consumers have independently reported to us essentially the same misleading con-
duct by its employees, see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text, and the firm's attorney
refuses to return our calls, we know of no independent tribunal or agency which has gath-
ered or assessed evidence of the misconduct that the consumers charge.
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original seller, the over-representation of AFC may have distorted our
study in this respect.
Another possible problem with the study is the potential bias in re-
lying on the consumers' own versions of what happened in their transac-
tions. Many consumers probably were reluctant to give inculpatory
answers during their interviews, particularly since the interviewer was an
unfamiliar person who did not share the cultural background of most of
the respondents. 38 The interviewer tried to limit this bias by verifying
facts, such as by examining the merchandise and any available contract
documents. But many inquiries, such as why the consumers did not pay
their bills or appear in court, were incapable of objective verification.
With all these qualifications, the skeptical reader may wonder what
this study could find. Our view is that this study is the second step -
after Caplovitz' initial foray - of a larger inquiry into the default judg-
ment process. Our fifteen respondents could not tell us everything
about that process, but neither do their responses tell us nothing at all.
In fact, what we have learned is disturbing, and we hope to provoke a
more systematic survey of possible consumer defenses that never see the
light of day.
C. Social Characteristics of the Consumers Interviewed
Table I shows, for each of the consumers interviewed, pertinent so-
cial characteristics and basic information about the transaction which led
to the lawsuit.
As Table I indicates, a large preponderance of those interviewed
were women.3 9 All but two of the interviewees were black, 40 and all
were between the ages of twenty-six and forty-nine. All were employed,
which may reflect the reluctance of merchants to extend credit to those
without jobs or the difficulty of contacting the unemployed. With two
exceptions, they had completed high school.
III. REASONS FOR NON-PAYMENT AND DEFAULT
Before analyzing whether these defendants might have fared better
in court if they had appeared, we examined why they did not honor their
obligations to pay for merchandise they had bought, and why they de-
faulted in the suits filed against them.
A. The Failure to Pay
The consumers gave four reasons for missing payments on their in-
stallment obligations; several consumers presented more than one rea-
38. Most of the respondents were black females; the interviewer was a white male.
39. The 72 files from which the interviewees were drawn did not show such a strong
predominance of women, and it is difficult to know what accounts for this phenomenon,
although it may be that the women among the 72 defendants were less mobile (or, to put it
another way, more stable) in their employment and therefore easier to locate.
40. Seventy percent of the District's residents are black. U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 626 (1988).
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son for not paying. Nine of the fifteen consumers conceded that they
stopped paying, at least in part, because of their own financial problems,
unrelated to the transaction that was the subject matter of the suit.41
Three believed that they were not obligated to make the payments de-
manded by the creditor. Psychological difficulties or shortcomings ap-
peared to be the principal factor in four cases. Two consumers said that
problems with the merchandise or the creditor caused them to refuse
making payments; they believed that withholding money would give
them leverage to negotiate successful resolutions of their complaints.
Table II summarizes the consumers' asserted reasons for not meeting
their contractual obligations:
Table II
1st Reason 2d Reason
Financial problems 8 1
Not obligated to pay 2 1
Psychological factors 3 1
Leverage for dispute with creditor 2 0
Of course these statistics conceal the human context of the failures
to pay, and thereby miss much of the meaning of these events. 42 The
interviews produced a fuller portrait of the problems that these consum-
ers faced.
1. Financial Problems
Two of the consumers missed payments because of an unexpected
reduction in income. One had purchased a motorcycle while he had
been employed as a mechanic, but then experienced unexpected medi-
cal problems:
I had a neck injury, and I was out of work for.., maybe about
3-4 weeks. And one other time I had jammed my finger on the
job, and I think I missed work for about a month then .... I
paid my health bills up, so I had other bills that were more im-
portant than having that bike at that time. But I was never
more than two months late [with my payments].
A consumer who, at the time of the interview, was employed as a
data entry operator, also had experienced difficulty maintaining a steady
income. She had purchased a video recorder and sofa from a Washing-
ton furniture dealer.
When I first purchased from [the merchant], I was working a
full-time position. At the time [I stopped paying] I was not
earning the money that I was once earning. During the time I
was laid off from that job I went for unemployment so I had a
lack in salary. So I did not have the money at that time to pay
them. That's why I missed the payments.
41. In Caplovitz' study, about 80% of the consumers stopped paying because of their
own "mishaps and shortcomings." CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 55.
42. Cf. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976); R. DANZIG, [HE CAPABIL-
ITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES (1978).
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The other consumers who cited their own financial difficulties as
their primary reason for failing to pay were not as explicit, even when
pressed, about the causes. A typical statement, for example, was that "I
was having some money troubles." These consumers were not clear
about whether the financial problems were temporary, as in the case of a
limited injury, or whether their general financial condition was such that
they could not have confidently predicted being able to make steady
payments over the life of the consumer obligation.
2. Not Obligated to Pay
Three consumers claimed that they were not obligated to pay what
the creditor demanded. These consumers reported that they were able
to pay, and (unlike those in our fourth category) they were not refusing
to pay in order to force the merchant to negotiate about an underlying
dispute. Instead, they believed themselves to be honoring the contract as
they understood it; it is apparent from the litigation that the merchant
thought otherwise.
In one instance, a merchant ordered furniture for a customer and
told her that she did not have to begin making her payments until she
received the merchandise. The consumer assumed that such an oral
promise was part of her contract with the merchant, although the written
contract actually required payments to begin at once. The furniture ar-
rived about two months after the contract was signed, and the consumer
then began to make the payments. To her surprise, she received a post
card stating that she was in default because she had already missed two
payments. The finance company required that she mail her late pay-
ments with her next payment. She believed, nevertheless, that she had
no obligation to send in the missed payments:
They told me that I would not have to start paying for the furni-
ture until I received the furniture. But the contract says other-
wise; they verbally told me [that I could wait], and looking back
I should have questioned it more .... I had not received any-
thing from the finance company as far as payments, you know, a
payment book or payment schedule. Nothing . . . I wasn't
worried at all. On December 15, I received my payment book
from [the finance company] and it showed that my first pay-
ment was due on October 15. So on December 15 I'm getting a
book that says I was already 3 months behind ... and I did not
even receive the furniture until the 26th. I wrote a letter and
explained that it was not possible for me to make up three pay-
ments immediately. Plus, to be absolutely honest with you,
although I say that I couldn't afford it, I could if I really thought
that I had to but I didn't think it was fair that I had to. I could
have done it but it wouldn't have been easy to do.
3. Psychological Factors
Several of the consumers invoked what we term "psychological rea-
sons" for not paying their creditors. One consumer claimed that her
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absent-mindedness was the sole factor that had caused her to stop pay-
ing on her contract with a direct seller. After she purchased a living
room set, a clock, carpet, a bedroom set, and a mattress and foundation,
she had a very hard time remembering to send in her monthly checks.
In her words:
Like a lot of times that I'm supposed to send a payment in or
whatever, I have it on time, but somehow or another I would be
so busy doing other things that I don't put it in the mail [so]
that they get it on time. A lot of times when I remember is
when somebody calls or says something about payment or
something, and then I say, "Oh my god, I got so-and-so in my
pocket and I got to go pay." And then.., if I'm anywhere near
the mail I would go and put it in the mail. I, you know, hate to
say I'm absent-minded, but I know I'm supposed to pay some-
thing and I don't within a week of time, time just bypasses me
and I don't even think about it.
Two defaulting consumers cited deaths in the family as the reason
for missing their payments to creditors. We classify these cases as psy-
chological factors rather than financial problems because the core justifi-
cation stemmed from their depression over the deaths, not their
shortage of money. A defendant had lost one of her three sons, and
spoke of her grief over his death:
My son had got killed and I was going through changes. A lot
of my bills got behind cause I really wasn't paying them. You
know, I wasn't thinking about paying the bills and stuff. I
didn't even pay the rent.
4. Leverage for Dispute with Creditor
Two consumers who had grievances against a creditor stopped pay-
ment as a means of forcing the creditor to resolve the problem. As one
of them explained it:
Once you pay a person something, that's it. You know, they
don't have to deal with you anymore, and that's with anything
you do. A little baby is like that, and they ain't got too much
sense. You try to get them to take medicine, and they want the
juice. If you give them the juice, what makes you think that
they're going to take the medicine now?
She described herself as "very angry" at the company from which she
had purchased a sofa and set of chairs. The sofa had not been treated to
make it spot-proof, as the seller promised it would be. The merchant
seemed unconcerned with her complaint, having quickly sold her con-
tract to a finance company. 43 The finance company was equally unre-
sponsive and, to use her metaphor, she stopped giving juice to the
43. Any defenses she had against the merchant could have been interposed in a suit
by the finance company. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3808 (1981). But this principle of law is
enforced only if the parties are aware of it and litigate the issue. It is not clear that it
affects creditor behavior in systems in which the overwhelming proportion of litigated dis-
putes end in default judgments.
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We are concerned not only with why the consumers stopped paying,
but also with why they did not go to court when they were sued. We
knew from Caplovitz' study that we should not assume that all of these
defaulting consumers would agree that they had in fact defaulted,4 5 so
we began our study of the reasons for default by asking whether the
consumer had gone to court on the date indicated in the summons.
Two consumers said that they had indeed gone to court.
One of these consumers stated that the plaintiffs attorney did not
show up in court that day, but because of her nervousness, she did not
respond when her name was called. Since plaintiffs' attorneys com-
monly say only one word ("plaintiff") to answer the calendar call, she
may well have simply missed hearing the adverse attorney's appearance.
If she had simply made her presence known, she would have avoided
losing by default. 4 6 She apparently suffered a defaultjudgment because
of her nervousness about being present in the court.
The other consumer who appeared in court was being sued by a
finance company for an outstanding balance on a contract arising from
his purchase of furniture from a direct seller. When he arrived in court,
he waited for the clerk to call his name, but his name was not an-
nounced. He thereafter went up to the clerk, who told him that "we
don't have this case." He went home, only to find several weeks later
that he suffered a default judgment and his wages were being garnish-
eed. There are two possible explanations for this consumer's default.
He may have gone to court on the wrong day. If he was there on the
right day, he may have gone to the wrong courtroom.
4 7
Aside from these unusual instances, most of the consumers inter-
viewed did not go to court. All of them specified at least one reason for
not appearing; several had multiple reasons. The reasons can be di-
vided into five general categories.
First, and most striking, seven consumers (including those who
mentioned this as a second or third reason) claimed that they were ad-
vised not to appear for their hearing. The sources of such advice will be
explored below. Second, five consumers said that they could not attend
44. The other consumer who stopped paying in order to pressure the creditor to pay
attention to her grievance believed that her $100 down payment had not been credited to
her account. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
45. See CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 203.
46. Indeed, if the creditor's attorney was in fact absent, she could have obtained a
judgment of dismissal, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3906(c) (1981), and if neither party answered
the roll call, the case probably would have been returned to the court's files, and the par-
ties notified of a new court date.
47. Regardless of the actual history of events, the existence of the default judgment
may be attributable in part to the consumer's ignorance of his procedural options; he was
unaware of the rule permitting judges to set aside default judgments for good cause. In-
stead, the consumer felt he had to accept having his already meager earnings slashed by
about 25% as a result of the garnishment.
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their hearing because they could not take the time off work, either be-
cause of the nature of their jobs or the adverse economic consequences
of missing a day's pay. Third, four of the consumers stated that they
never received a summons, and thus were not aware of the impending
hearing. A fourth and related reason, stated by three consumers, was
that they received the summons, but did not understand its terms or
what it meant. Finally, although only one consumer said that she owed
the money and did not see any purpose in arguing in court about it, the
likelihood of losing the case may have contributed in some degree to





Advised not to go 6 1 0
Could not leave work 3 2 0
Did not receive timely summons 3 0 1
Did not understand summons 1 1 1
No defenses 0 0 1
1. Advised Not to Go
Perhaps the most surprising finding of the study was that so many
consumers were advised not to appear in court. 4 8 Of the seven consum-
ers who were told not to appear, five of them received their advice di-
rectly from AFC.4 9 The explanations given by these five consumers
have some startling similarities. According to the consumers, 50 each of
them received the summons and telephoned AFC to negotiate. Upon
reaching some sort of compromise, they were told that the court action
would be cancelled. But AFC subsequently entered default judgments
against them.
An office secretary explained:
They told me to disregard it. When I called [AFC], I said, "Are
you telling me that I do not have to appear in court now," and I
asked them that question a few times to make sure, otherwise I
would have gone. And he said, "That's right, you don't have to
48. But see CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 205 (51 % of defaulting defendants
in Chicago, 47% in Detroit, and 40% in New York City, believed court action had been
discontinued after settlement or advised not to go to court by creditors' or own attorney).
49. AFC was over-represented in the study because of the wealth of information its
files contained. In some respects, the over-representation of AFC probably does not sig-
nificantly distort this study. But because AFC (rather than the merchants from which it
purchased consumer obligations) gave the advice in question, the unusual number of AFC-
initiated cases in this study probably causes the Table to overstate the actual frequency of
creditor advice not to appear in court. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. One of us (Sterling) called AFC to inquire into its procedures for handling calls
from defendants it is suing. The person answering the phone twice stated: "That is infor-
mation I cannot divulge." When pressed for a comment, AFC directed the author to
Ethan Block, its attorney. Mr. Block did not return three telephone calls.
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appear in court. We'll take care of it. We'll notify the
attorneys."
A forty-four year old buyer had fallen behind in payments for her
dinette set. After she received the summons, she promptly contacted
AFC:
I spoke to the people at Associated Finance and they said
everything was O.K., just put a payment in the mail, and that's
what I did. I didn't get anything else [from AFC]. When I
called I said I got a summons from court about my payments to
you, and I said I knew that I'm a month behind, and I said I will
make a payment today if that's going to keep this out of court.
He said that's fine, just keep your payments up .... I never
heard anything else from them. Then in June my boss at my
job said I have a garnish here. I knew any other way I would
have gone down there [to court]. I would have gone. That's
the only reason I didn't go.
After learning of the default judgment against her, one of our inter-
viewees did some investigative work:
Just to see how they run, I had my friend call them and tell
them that he had gotten this summons and his check was being
attached, and he wanted to make arrangements to get rid of it.
And he [the AFC employee] told him, "Just make a payment
and send it on in and everything will be taken care of." He
didn't even ask him his name, and hung up the phone ....
That made me very angry, even more angry. When you call
[AFC], they say, "We'll transfer you to the legal department."
But I'm pretty sure that it wasn't the legal department; it's just
somebody who sits there and answers the phone and tells you
this and that .... I was under the impression that anytime you
get a summons and you call the [plaintiff] and you make ar-
rangements, that the lawyer was supposed to return it to files if
I'm not mistaken. [When I called], he told me, "Well you're
behind, so make two payments and pick up from there, and I'll
just drop everything and take care of everything . . . . What
they did was make arrangements with me, and still sent the
judgment through. He attached it anyway, regardless of
whether I paid him or not ... I'm not mad if they send me a
summons because I didn't make the payment. That's not what
I'm mad at. I'm mad because they have a lawyer and every-
thing, and they tell me one thing, and I'm doing it, and all of a
sudden they're still trying to attack me, that's what I'm mad at.
Another of these interviewees claimed to have spoken not merely to
the AFC employee who answers the telephone, but to Ethan Block, the
attorney who represents AFC in the Small Claims Court. She asserted
that:
I talked to Mr. Block and he told me that if I had the money
there, at his office or to [AFC], that it would be no problem,
there would be no judgment against me. This is what he told
me and this is the same thing they told me at Associated [Fi-
nance] .... I guess that's what they do; their person goes to
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court and they tell you not to go there so they can get that
[judgment] .... Both the attorney and the employee at Associ-
ated [Finance] told me .... They led me to believe that it was
taken care of, and I'm running to get the money in the mail. I
was willing to bring the money out there to them.
Confusion about the duty to appear may result from conversations
with court officials as well as from those with creditors. A thirty year old
legal secretary refrained from appearing on the date listed in the sum-
mons after a conversation with a clerk at the Small Claims Court:
I called the clerk's office and spoke to the clerk. And I also
explained to the clerk the trouble I was having with not being
able to get in touch with the attorney on the summons, and that
[the man] at AFC was very rude and not dealing with me. I said
I don't know if there's some kind of record there with my case
in it, but if you could make note that not only would I like to
change the court date, but that I'm having difficulty with the
attorney. I wanted her to note it in the record. [The clerk]
didn't say anything about a new date, just that I would be con-
tacted. She didn't act like there was a problem with that. Ap-
parently .... the garnishment went in because I did not make
the court date, I guess. That was it. My wages were being
garnished.
2. Could Not Leave Work
Five consumers cited concern about missing work to explain their
failure to show up to court. This reason was especially weighty for those
consumers who had lower incomes, probably because they were less
likely to be salaried employees, and could not afford to miss a day's pay.
For example, a waitress was troubled by the possibility of missing work
for the hearing:
In order to have made it, it would have pushed me. I mean, I
would have had to be at work at 11:30. I could have been (in
court] at 8:00,51 but they call your name at random; they go
down the list. I would have missed work. At Small Claims
Court, god knows, you could be there forever.
Another consumer, a legal secretary, mentioned the difficulty of
getting away from work as a strong factor mitigating against a court ap-
pearance. For those readers who are familiar with law firms, her expla-
nation will probably provoke some sympathy:
It was impossible for me to get away from the office that day.
Impossible is maybe a bad word. It was not the best time for
me to leave the office. If there was a death in the family, or
something absolutely urgent, I could have left the office. [The
51. The calendar call at D.C. Small Claims Court actually begins at 9:00. However,
this consumer's fear of delay is not unjustified. Voluntary conciliation and hearings on
motions by either party take place between 10:00 and early afternoon. If a defendant
actually wants a trial, she will have to wait at least until early afternoon, and often until late
afternoon or a later day.
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attorney I work for] relies on me a great deal, and we're very
busy, and we have to get coverage in advance.
3. No Timely Summons
Four consumers claimed not to have received timely notice of their
impending hearings. One consumer, who had stated this as a secondary
reason for not appearing, admitted during the interview that she had ten
days notice. However, two defendants maintained consistently that they
never received a summons, and one reported receiving a summons after
the hearing date. Their claims, if true, raise a problem that has plagued
court systems in many cities. 52 A thirty-three year old defendant
reported:
I wasn't able to pay the bill on time. Then they closed, and the
accounts went over to a law firm .... I told the lady who called
me that I was willing to pay the bill. At that time they said they
were trying to close out all their accounts because by them be-
ing out of business they wanted to make sure that everything
was clear .... Shortly afterwards, I don't know what happened,
but I received a letter on my job from Small Claims Court. It
was a . . . garnishee order. This came on my job, and they
started deducting money from my paycheck to pay that claim,
and that's how they got the money. I got a copy of the gar-
nishee order, and called the [law firm] listed on it. They told
me that the summons had been sent out to my address, and as I
stated to the [attorney's secretary who I spoke with], I work
from 8:30 to 5:00; there's no way no one is in my house that
can accept the summons for me. You know, the summons
should be handed to me in my hand, if that's the way it's sup-
posed to be done. The summons was never issued to me. So
[the attorney's secretary] said that right there was irrelevant, it
didn't mean anything since the garnishee has been put on my
check and I will have to pay it that way.
The affidavit of service in this case claimed that the interviewee was
served at her home on a weekday morning. That affidavit contains no
description of the defendant's physical characteristics; a large space on
the affidavit form is expressly reserved for such information, but it was
left blank. As a result, it is impossible to verify either party's version of
the facts.
Another interviewee, a forty-nine year old consumer, claimed that
she did not receive a summons and only learned from our interview,
months later, that she had been sued:
I know what a summons is, but what I'm saying is I don't re-
member getting one from them saying that I have to be to court
at a particular day. They had no right to sue me because if I
was late I always paid late charges .... The thing is, I didn't get
any letter from them, because if I had, I would have gone, and
52. See the discussion of "sewer service" in CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at
194 nn.5-6 and sources cited therein.
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would have asked for an extended date or something. But I
didn't get that [summons].
Once again, the affidavit of service indicated that this consumer was
served, but it contained no description of the defendant's physical char-
acteristics. It is possible that she received the summons but did not ac-
tually understand its significance. However, the process server's failure
to note even a general description of the defendant suggests that this
defendant may never have been served.
The consumer who received a summons after the court date said
that she then called the court, but she says that the clerk to whom she
spoke did not inform her how to move to set aside the judgment.5 3
Asked whether she knew she had to go to court, she stated:
No, I didn't know. If I would have known, I would have did
something. You know, I would try to do something. Once you
get tangled up in court, I mean somebody's going to pay the
court fees; I know that for a fact. So I was trying to stay out of
court . . . . Yeah, I got [a summons]. This guy came to my
apartment and delivered it. But by the time he delivered it, it
was past the date. But what could I do? If they would have
called me up and told me if I didn't get my butt down here they
would have me in court, I would have set up some type of ap-
pointment with them, you know to have a meeting .... The
summons came two or three weeks after the court date. I called
the court up right away, and they told me to call [the plaintiff]
in order to straighten it out. [The clerk] said if the bill was paid
off, get in contact with the company. I called [the company] up,
and they said I would have to pay all the money up in order to
be all right with them.
Here, too, the affidavit of service conflicts with this consumer's report; it
records that she was served at home nine days before the hearing date.
4. Could Not Understand Summons
A consumer may fail to understand a summons in two ways. First,
the consumer may not understand the actual language used on the sum-
mons. Second, even a consumer who understands the words on the
summons may not realize their significance.
The consumers who reported that they did not understand the sum-
mons fell largely into the second category. 54 They were not unedu-
cated; all of them were high school graduates, and one of them had
completed about two semesters of college. A thirty-two year old defend-
ant was particularly candid about her inability to comprehend the sum-
mons; when asked whether she understood the summons' significance,
she declared: "[n]o, no, no I was totally confused .... I figured I could
53. A clerk of the Small Claims Branch told one of the authors that defaulting defend-
ants who call claiming they had no notice, which "happens all the time," are told to file a
motion to have the judgment vacated, not to call the plaintiffs attorney.
54. One consumer, however, probably experienced the first type of inability to under-
stand the summons. She reported: "No, I don't understand this here on top, the numbers
and all that crap. I don't understand none of that."
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still like talk to them. Maybe [the summons] was more trying to get my
attention, scare you into [paying] more or less. I didn't think there was a
court [hearing] on it."
5. No Defense
One consumer felt that the plaintiff's court action was justified, and
that she had nothing to argue about in court: "[if] I was a business per-
son I would have done the same thing [they did]. I don't feel like I was
right to be defaulting on payments, you know, but I was angry. And
there's a difference between being right and being angry." Ironically,
this consumer may have had defenses arising out of the circumstances of
her purchase. 5 5 In addition, this consumer was one of those told by
AFC not to appear in court, thereby providing her with a potential coun-
terclaim based on the creditor's misleading conduct. 56 Her feelings of
hopelessness may have been unwarranted.
To summarize, there were several patterns in these consumers' de-
scriptions of their defaults. Most could not pay because of financial
hardship. Nevertheless, they had a right to a day in court. Yet a high
proportion of them were advised not to go to court. In addition, several
did not receive or understand their summonses. So what? If they had
gone to court, could they have won their cases?
IV. POSSIBLE DEFENSES OR COUNTERCLAIMS
Each defendant was asked a series of questions designed to elicit
facts pertinent to possible defenses or counterclaims. In addition,
eleven of the court files included the underlying contract documents,
which enabled us to assess compliance with disclosure legislation.
Where possible, we examined the merchandise in question. Even so,
our inquiries may not have revealed all possible defenses. Students in
the law school consumer protection clinic, in which we have both partici-
pated, frequently discover that the facts and theories which win a case
often do not appear during an initial interview and may not emerge until
the consumer's representative has done weeks of work on a case.
We discovered that the fifteen defendants had four kinds of de-
fenses. Some of them pertained to selling practices, such as the content
of the merchant's advertising. Some involved the quality of the mer-
chandise. A third set of possible defenses arose under age-old common
law rules or under modern statutes regulating the content or form of
agreements between merchants and consumers. Finally, some possible
counterclaims related to debt collection practices.
A. Selling Practices
The District of Columbia has a particularly strong Consumer Pro-
55. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing this consumer's possible de-
fenses arising out of her dissatisfaction with the furniture).
56. See infra notes 99-103 (discussing laws prohibiting such deceptive conduct).
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tection Procedures Act ("CPPA") 57 as well as other consumer protec-
tion statutes. 58  Several interviewees gave us information which
suggested that these laws had been violated.
A twenty-nine year old defendant described her purchase of a living
room set from a furniture dealer, and although we have no independent
verification of her account, it raises the possibility that the merchant vio-
lated the CPPA:
The advertisement said so many pieces of furniture for a cer-
tain amount of money, or they had sets of furniture, like bed-
room sets and living room sets, and they would give you the
credit. It was one of those "never had credit, need credit, need
to establish credit" deals, which is the reason I really was inter-
ested .... Some of the things they showed me that were adver-
tised were worse [than they looked in the ad]. One of the
couches was hard as a brick; I was like, you know, you would
not want to sit on this. They told me about some more expen-
sive ones. They . . .were always willing to go up [in price].
This account, if true, is a classic example of the "bait and switch"
tactic that Caplovitz exposed in an earlier book. 59 A merchant using this
device may actually be prepared, if necessary, to sell the advertised mer-
chandise at the advertised price. "What most often happens, however,
is that the unsuspecting customer is convinced by the salesman that he
doesn't really want the goods advertised . . .and is then persuaded to
buy a smaller amount of more expensive goods."'60 The National Advi-
sory Commission on Civil Disorders identified bait-and-switch selling as
an "exploitative tactic" which contributed to the urban riots of the late
1 960 s . 6 1 The tactic is banned by District of Columbia law.
6 2
Similarly, a forty-four year old consumer went to a furniture com-
pany in response to a newspaper advertising insert:
Some of the things in the paper said this is the price, but you go
57. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901 et seq. (1981). Two articles on the statute's legislative
history and interpretation have been published. Simon, A Guide to the D.C. Consumer Protec-
tion Act, DIST. LAW., Fall 1977 at 43; Drymalski, Consumer Protection: Administrative Decisions
Affecting the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act of 1976, 50 WASH. LAw. (Nov.-Dec. 1987).
One section of this statute includes 26 subsections, each of which describes several prohib-
ited practices. It is unlawful, for example, for a merchant to "represent that goods or
services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, accessories, characteristics, in-
gredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have" D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(a)
(198 i); "represent that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style,
or model, if in fact they are of another" Id. at § 28-3904(d); or to "advertise or offer goods
or services without supplying reasonably expected public demand, unless the advertise-
ment or offer discloses a limitation of quantity ..... Id. at § 28-3904(i). Violations of any
of these provisions can entitle a consumer to recover treble damages, punitive damages,
and reasonable attorney fees. Id. at § 28-3905(k).
58. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3901 et seq. (1981); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 16 (Apr. 1984).
59. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 29 (1967).
60. Id.
61. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (KERNER COMMISSION), RE-
PORT 276 (Bantam ed. 1968).
62. It is unlawful in the District of Columbia for a merchant to "advertise or offer
goods or services without the intent to sell them or without the intent to sell them as
advertised or offered." D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(h) (1981).
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ahead and they don't even have the set. The set that I wanted
was in the paper from [the company], then I went there and
they said that set was out of stock, they didn't have any, but it
was in the paper. I said, "But it was in your flyer that I re-
ceived." She said, "Well that was a problem they've had in in-
conveniencing the customers," that they were sorry .... We
went really looking for a dinette set, and they was trying to sell
us this dinette set for $2400, or whatever it was. I said no, I
wasn't going to buy [that] dinette set. We decided to get a bed-
room set instead. They said, "Buy this bedroom set because
it's not going to be on sale after this week" or this, that, and the
other, so we went on and put the deposit on the bedroom set.
63
B. The Quality of the Merchandise
District of Columbia law includes the warranty provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 64 modified somewhat to protect consumers
from disclaimers of implied warranties. 6 5 In addition, the CPPA in-
cludes unusual provisions, going beyond the unconscionability language
of the Uniform Commercial Code, to prohibit unconscionable selling
practices.
Several of the defendants whom we contacted might have had de-
fenses under these laws. A forty-six year old interviewee purchased a
sofa and a set of chairs from a Washington furniture dealer. She wanted
her furniture to be protected from stains, so she contracted with the
seller to stain-proof the items before they were delivered. But problems
developed after she received the goods:
They delivered [the furniture]. I was paying the monthly note
.... It was supposed to have been treated. I paid extra money
to have it treated, meaning it resists soil; it's something like a
scotch-guard, and it keeps stuff from soaking into it. Then my
furniture started turning yellow, and it got real dirty. And I
told the people, I said, "I don't think it's been treated." And I
asked them to send their inspector out. This started the end of
November, first part of December. He came out in January
.... And he came out, and he tested it. And he said, "No, it
had not been treated." So I called 'em all back. I must have
called them, between then and April, every week. And they
gave me the runaround .... I kept telling them that the inspec-
tor said that it hadn't been treated. So then I got, you know,
sort of angry. So I stopped paying them.
After this consumer stopped paying, she was sued by the finance com-
63. This defendant may have had a claim under D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(i) (1981),
see supra note 57; as well as a claim under D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(h) (1981). Subsec-
tion (i) is apparently a back-up provision making it easier to enforce the prohibition of
bait-and-switch tactics in the face of merchants' claims that they subjectively intended to
sell the goods advertised.
64. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-312 et seq. (1981).
65. Statements like "as is" are not effective to disclaim implied warranties; the
merchant must specify the defects against which he is making no warranty. Id. at § 28:2-
316.1.
377.
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pany and suffered a default judgment. 66 If she had appeared in court,
she could have argued that the seller violated his express warranty that
the furniture would be treated.6 7 She could also have argued that the
seller breached the implied warranty of merchantability.
68
Another consumer was very dissatisfied with a living room set and a
coffee table purchased from a Washington furniture dealer. The seller
replaced the scarred coffee table but would not resolve her complaints
about the living room set. The core of her dissatisfaction with the couch
was that the fabric was unravelling, causing the buttons to fall off and
the seams to rip apart. She was worried that the couch would rip, as it
once had, if anyone sat too near its edge. The merchant had re-sewn
one sofa button but we could see that the fabric remained excessively
brittle. This defendant, too, might have been able to assert the defense
of breach of an implied warranty, but she defaulted in court 69 and at the
time of the interview, the judgment was being enforced against her
wages under a garnishment order.
A consumer in our survey had twice purchased goods from a door-
to-door salesman, and he had suffered two default judgments. His first
purchase was a set of bunk beds. He then purchased a television from
the same seller. This consumer had complaints concerning both items.
The television: "never did play right. The picture don't come out clear.
... there are them lines in it. [The seller] said that it's electronic and
how clear the picture is. [Also], the swivel base of it . . . ain't turning
properly unless you put your foot on it." The television did not appear
to be of average quality,70 and it probably was not suitable for the ordi-
nary purposes for which televisions are used.
7 1
In another example, bunk beds were improperly installed by the
seller:
The guy who screwed in the bunk beds didn't put any washers
on them. So I called them and I say, "Look, the guy's going to
have to come back out here and prepare these bunk beds
right." He said, "Well, you're a mover, why don't you go han-
dle it for me?" I said, "That ain't no problem, I can handle it,
but I'm saying still, I paid my money, it should be put up
right." 'Cause I wasn't here at the time; my lady was here, and
they just left the empty boxes and all that stuff in the hallway,
and the bunk bed ladder wasn't there .... He showed me a
book [with beds in it], and he showed me it was going to be a
66. This was the one defendant who said that she did not appear in court because she
had no defenses. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. In our view, she did not know
the law and was therefore overly conservative in estimating her chance of success in court.
67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-313(1)(a) (1981).
68. Furniture that turned yellow in a few months arguably was not fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used, and thus did not comply with the warranty cre-
ated by D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-314(2)(c) (1981).
69. This consumer said that she did not appear in court because of her reluctance to
lose a day's wages.
70. The interviewer was able to see for himself that the picture was unclear and com-
posed of many visible, thin lines, and that the swivel base did not rotate properly.
71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2:314 (1981).
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real good deal on the bunk beds and stuff. But it wasn't put up
properly as it was in the picture. They didn't put all the screws
in properly. The ladder wasn't there. The washers wasn't in
there. They screwed the screws into the wood on the bunk bed.
When I got home, the bunk bed was like a used bunk bed. It
was scratched up, the screws were screwed too tightly into the
wood, the bunk bed was really loose. I had to take it all apart
again and put it up myself and put some washers in when I got
back home from work. It was a new bunk bed, but the damage
they did putting it together made it look old. 'Cause, see, I'm a
professional mover, and I have to put things together and take
things apart, and I know the proper ways of doing that, and
they did it a poor-fashioned way . . . . So here are my kids
without a bed guard and a ladder to the bunk bed.
This consumer, too, could have asserted defenses. The seller may
have breached his express warranty, conveyed by the picture that the
consumer was shown, 7 2 when he delivered a non-conforming bed, and
may have further breached it by damaging the bed in the course of in-
stallation. In addition, he may have breached the implied warranty of
merchantability by failing to supply a ladder and a guard, two items es-
sential for the safe use of the an upper bunk. These breaches might not
have voided the contract altogether, but they could have provided off-
setting damages in a judgment or settlement. In addition, the consumer
may have had defenses under the CPPA, entitling him to a greater mea-
sure of damages as a result of essentially the same merchant misconduct.
The seller apparently enticed the consumer to purchase the merchan-
dise with a picture of bunk beds with safety guards and ladders, thereby
representing that they had accessories that they did not have. 73
C. The Content and Form of the Agreements
Like other jurisdictions, the District of Columbia regulates the con-
tent and form of consumer credit contracts. A merchant who refrains
from deceptive practices and who honors all warranties, express and im-
plied, must still take care to enter into agreements- that are valid under
common law contract rules and must refrain from violating a welter of
disclosure laws and other legislation designed to improve the ability of
consumers to enter into fair agreements. Failure to observe these re-
quirements may provide the consumer with full or partial defenses to
the creditor's demand for payment. The consumers in our sample had
possible defenses of four types, although the situations they described
do not begin to exhaust the ways in which consumer contracts are
regulated.
74
72. Id. at § 28-2:313(1)(b).
73. Id. at § 28 -3904(a).
74. For example, District of Columbia law forbids rebates to induce consumer credit
sales to others, id. at § 28-3810 (1981); door-to-door sales unless the buyer is offered a
right to cancel, id. at § 28-3811; contract sales of health spa services unless certain disclo-
sures are made, id. at § 28-3817(b)(4); collection of funds by unlicensed home improve-
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1. Payment Disputes
Payment disputes and misunderstandings are common in consumer
installment transactions; 75 in addition, payment is a traditional common
law defense to a contract action, and partial payment, while not a com-
plete defense to a suit, reduces (to the extent payment has been made)
the damages that a creditor can obtain. A merchant who errs in credit-
ing payments is likely to repeat the mistake at the time he or she sends
the consumer's file to a lawyer for collection, and the error will then find
its way into the lawsuit in the demand for damages in the complaint. If
the consumer defaults, that amount will probably be awarded in
judgment.
76
One consumer in our sample claimed a billing error. This con-
sumer had purchased a bedroom set from a Washington furniture
dealer. She said that her $100 down payment had never been credited
to her account. Eventually, she realized that there was a $100 difference
between her own computation of her balance and the seller's record of
it. As she stated:
If I owed them money, I would be more than happy to pay for
it. But I mean I don't feel I owe them the money, and I was
willing to sit down with them so we can go over these things
,cause I got all my receipts, and [if they can] show me where I
owe [them] the $100, we could just square things off .... And
I got in contact with them, and I told them I wasn't going to
[pay the $100], because I got my records, and I could come
where they're at, and we could sit down and talk.
Although this consumer appeared sincerely to believe that the cred-
itor had made a mistake, she said that she could not find her receipts at
the time of the interview, and we were therefore unable to confirm the
accuracy of her claim. 7 7 If, however, she really had paid $100 that was
not credited to her account, she would have had a partial defense to the
creditor's suit for $695.
2. Unconscionability
The CPPA includes provisions on unconscionability that are consid-
erably more explicit than the equity doctrine of unconscionability or the
ment contractors before all work is completed, D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 16, § 800.1 (Apr.
1984); and sales of motor vehicles by unlicensed dealers, id. at § 300.1.
75. In Caplovitz' multi-city study, payment misunderstandings were the primary rea-
son for consumers' failures to continue paying the creditor in 7% of the 1320 cases he
examined. CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE, supra note 3, at 125-26.
76. If a judge conducts an exparte hearing on damages, he or she may demand to see
the creditor's ledgers and may therefore notice arithmetical errors. But the judge is not
required to examine the seller's records, and most do not. Furthermore, if the consumer
is not present or represented, the chance of such an error being caught is reduced. Fur-
thermore, failures to credit payments in the ledger could not be detected at this stage; only
the consumer's receipts will reveal the error.
77. In addition, we are skeptical that any creditor would sue a customer rather than
accept her offer to examine receipts jointly in order to resolve a discrepancy.
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unconscionability provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. 78 In the
District of Columbia, it is an unlawful trade practice, regardless of
whether a consumer is injured, to make or enforce unconscionable
terms or provisions of sales. 79 Courts applying this law are directed to
consider a series of factors such as knowledge by the seller of the poor
credit-worthiness of a consumer to whom credit was extended, the in-
ability of the consumer to benefit from the goods or services being sold,
a gross disparity between the price of the goods and their fair market
value, and the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect his or her
interests by reasons of age, physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, il-
literacy or inability to understand the language of the agreement. 80 An
unconscionable consumer credit sale may be denied enforcement in
whole or part.8 1 Essentially, the unconscionability defense is implicated
when a merchant, with superior knowledge and control over the drafting
of the agreement, is taking advantage of a consumer who is in a weaker
bargaining position, disabling him from adequately protecting his
interests.
8 2
The unconscionability doctrine is still relatively new, and assessing
how judges would apply it to particular cases is inevitably speculative. 83
An unconscionability defense could possibly'have been made by the
consumer who bought the bunk beds and color television from a door-
to-door salesman. 84 In addition to the problems involving the quality of
the merchandise, there appeared to be considerable disparity between
the price he paid and the value of the goods. The price of the television
was $940, compared with a typical price between $650 and $700;85 the
bunk beds cost the consumer $699, compared with a price of $299 he
said he saw them priced at after the purchase. Other factors, too, could
have encouraged a judge to find this agreement unconscionable. This
consumer earned only about $20,000. The seller's knowledge of this in-
come, and of the facts that the consumer and his unemployed wife were
supporting three children, may have amounted to knowledge that there
was little likelihood that the buyer could pay the obligation in full. 86
Furthermore, the consumer had only a tenth grade education and had
obvious problems with reading; a judge might have determined that the
78. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-302 (1981).
79. Id. at § 28-3904(r) (1981).
80. Id.
81. Id. at § 2 8 -3 8 1 2 (g) (1981).
82. See generally NATIONAL CONSUMER LAw CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES (2d ed. 1988).
83. This very fact, however, suggests that to the extent that the vast majority of con-
sumer credit lawsuits are resolved through default judgments, justice may suffer, both be-
cause the consumers might win their cases with unconscionability defenses and because the
default judgments deny the judges opportunities to interpret the statutes.
84. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the mer-
chandise in this case).
85. Sales of this model of television, which he had purchased in 1986, had been dis-
continued at the time of this study. Interviewer Sterling obtained this quotation from a
salesman at the Hoffman Video Center in Washington, D.C., who was familiar with the
model at the time of its popularity.
86. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904(r)(1) (1981).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW




The Federal Truth-in-Lending Law8" imposes some disclosure re-
quirements on consumer credit contracts; in addition, the District of Co-
lumbia regulates the form of such contracts in detail. For example, a
retail installment contract must be a single document, each page of
which must be signed by both the buyer and the seller.8 9 At the top of
the first page of the agreement, the words "RETAIL INSTALLMENT
CONTRACT" must be printed in at least twelve-point extra-bold
type. 90 If the printed terms of each contract are contained on both sides
of a page, the first page must say, in bold type: "NOTICE: SEE
OTHER SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION."- 9 1 Furthermore,
a retail installment contract must contain "a description of the goods or
services purchased, including, where applicable, the trade name, and the
model number of the goods."
9 2
Five different forms were used in the eleven contracts examined in
the course of this study.9 3 In all cases, the federal requirements ap-
peared to have been met. But in several cases, we could determine that
the District's additional disclosure rules had been violated. 94 Only one
of the eleven contracts had the words "RETAIL INSTALLMENT CON-
TRACT" in twelve-point boldface type at the top of the page. Although
each contract had a front and a reverse, none of the contracts complied
fully with the law requiring that the front include a boldface notice that
the other side also contains important information. Three of the five
front sides failed to refer to the reverse side at all. The front sides of the
other two forms included references to the reverse, but they did not use
the statutorily required language, 95 and on both forms the cross-refer-
ence was printed in small letters rather than bold type.
Of the eleven contracts we examined, only four clearly complied
with the District's requirements regarding a description of the goods.
Two merchants violated the rule by listing only a serial number on the
contracts, without any attempt at a description of the merchandise. Six
merchants appear to have violated the rule by listing "per invoice" or
87. See id. at § 28-3904(r)(5) (1981).
88. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 101, 82 Stat. 146 (1978).
89. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 16, § 106.1 (Apr. 1984). The D.C. Municipal Regulations
codify laws passed in the years preceding D.C. home rule, and they have the same legal
force as statutes enacted since 1973 by the elected Council of the District of Columbia.
90. Id. at § 106.2.
91. Id. at § 106.3.
92. Id. at § 105.4.
93. We were able to examine only I I of the 15 contracts entered into by the
interviewees.
94. None of the consumers knew what the District of Columbia's rules were, so none
could know of these violations.
95. One form said, "The reverse of this page contains additional terms applicable to
this purchase"; the other said "NOTICE TO BUYER: 1. The terms of this contract are
contained on both sides of this page. See other side for important information."
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"invoice" instead of including a product description on the contract
form. 9 6 On the other hand, the effect of violations of the District's dis-
closure rules on the rights of the buyer and seller is not clear. The law
explicitly provides that any person who violates it shall be subject to a
"penalty or a fine" of up to three hundred dollars or imprisonment for
up to ten days,9 7 but there appear to be no reported decisions regarding
whether the "penalty" runs in favor of an affected consumer in private
litigation (like punitive damages) or whether it runs only in favor of the
government in a separate suit brought by the District. If the word "pen-
alty" implies only a public remedy, a consumer might still have private
recourse under a section of the CPPA which provides for judicial awards
of treble and punitive damages for violation of any "trade practice in
violation of a law of the District of Columbia within the jurisdiction of
[the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs]." 9 8 Until the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals rules that disclosure violations
cannot be enforced in private litigation, such violations at least give con-
sumer defendants a "bargaining chip" to use in negotiations with credi-
tors and a claim to make to a judge. However, these chips and claims
were unwittingly discarded by the defaulting consumers whom we
interviewed.
D. Debt Collection
Like most jurisdictions, the District of Columbia has legislation
prohibiting a variety of debt collection practices. 99 They include using
language "intended to unreasonably abuse the hearer or reader,"'
0 0
"placing telephone calls with the intent to harass" any person,' 0 ' and
making "any false representation or implication of the ... status [of a
claim] in any legal proceeding."' 0 2 Violations can make a creditor liable
for punitive damages.'
0 3
Associated Finance Company, which appears to have told five of our
96. Contracts sold to a finance company for collection would not necessarily include
the invoice, so violation of this law would make it more difficult for a third-party creditor to
know what goods were being financed or to be able to communicate meaningfully with a
consumer who calls with a problem.
97. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 16, § 122.1 (Apr. 1984).
98. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1) (1981). Under the CPPA, the Director of the
Office of Consumer Protection, which later became the Department of Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs, has a duty to investigate every complaint filed and to determine
whether the trade practice which occurred violated "any statute, regulation, rule of com-
mon law, or other law, of the District of Columbia." The Committee Report which accom-
panied Council passage of the law said that the phrase "other law" even "includes
executive and administrative orders, and common law." REPORT ON BILL 1-253 FROM THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, at 19 (Mar. 24, 1976). Further-
more, "the word 'law' in this section means the same as it does ... throughout the bill,"
id., suggesting that the use of the word 'law' in the section providing for remedies enforce-
able in court provides remedies for violations of any consumer protection law, not only
prohibitions contained in the CPPA itself.
99. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814 (1981).
100. Id. at § 28-3814(d)(1).
101. Id. at § 28-3814(d)(2).
102. Id. at § 28-3814(0(5).
103. Id. at § 28-3814j)(2).
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interviewees that they need not go to court because the cases against
them were being discontinued, may have made false "implication[s] of
the ... status" of legal claims in these cases. In three other cases, collec-
tion efforts may have amounted to harassment. One defendant said that
"[t]hey harassed me on the phone. They would call, like, within a week
they would call four or five times."
Another felt physically endangered by a bill collector's claims that if
she didn't send the money, "they [would] be coming over here [to her
house]." The third said that the collector "used foul language
[although] I don't recall his calling me a name." Of course we do not
know whether these consumers could have proved the content of the
telephone calls to the satisfaction of ajudge, or whether the judge would
have regarded the content, even if proved, to be in violation of the
statute.
V. CONCLUSION
Table IV summarizes the defenses that may have been available to
the fifteen defaulting defendants in our sample, based on the informa-
tion they provided to us and the eleven contracts that we were able to
examine.
It is apparent from this chart that, based on the verifiable formal
violations alone, eleven of the fifteen defendants may have had defenses
to the litigation. Additionally, if our interviewees are to be believed,
eight of the fifteen defendants had good faith defenses other than formal
violations to their creditors' suits. 10 4 Indeed, of the. fifteen defendants,
only three seemed to have no possible defenses. Five had one arguable
defense; five had two claims that could have been pressed; one had three
possible defenses; and one could have made four different arguments
against the creditor's claim.
Perhaps all of the defendants were lying to us. However, deceiving
us could not relieve them of their credit obligations or their garnish-
ments, because we told them that we wanted to interview them for re-
search purposes only and that we could not assist them legally. Yet,
some of them might have shaded or selectively recalled facts so that we
would see them as unwitting victims rather than careless consumers;
some might even have come to believe a version of the story that was
less than objective. But we doubt that distortion by these defendants
could account for all of their apparent defenses. Their narratives were
usually detailed and in most cases internally consistent. They seemed
willing to be self-critical; for example, nine of them admitted that they
104. This tabulation is somewhat conservative in that it excludes claims that might have
been made by five AFC defendants based upon their having been told that the suits against
them were being discontinued. Although AFC may have violated the law against misrepre-
senting the status of a claim in a legal proceeding, see supra notes 99-103 and accompany-
ing text, we did not include these five cases in our count because we did not want this
summary chart to include possible defenses traceable to the conduct of one particular
creditor who was over-represented in our survey. See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
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had stopped paying because of their own financial difficulties, rather
than the creditor's transgressions. Furthermore, one of the researchers
was able to observe the merchandise in several cases and the contract
documents in most cases, and these objective indicators were enough to
suggest that the consumers would have had some basis for defending
their suits. Let us assume that three-quarters of the twelve respondents
with possible defenses could not have prevailed in court because they
were lying, because they were telling the truth to us but would not have
been credible to a judge, or because their claims, even if proved, would
not have entitled them to relief. Even under this drastic assumption,
three defendants, one fifth of our sample, would still have defaulted in
cases in which they could have obtained whole or partial relief.
It might seem at first blush that the defendants whom we surveyed
should have gone to court to defend themselves, but it is not clear that
they would have been any more successful. They might have been able
to tell the judge about merchandise defects, but they might not have
known that a seller's advertising practices could justify relief from a
creditor's claim, and they could not have known about how to effectively
assert the more technical defenses (such as the formal violations) or the
defenses requiring novel legal argument (such as price-based unconscio-
nability). Indeed, we have seen that although the default rate in the Dis-
trict of Columbia is lower than in other cities, most of its consumer
defendants who do appear consent to judgment in full against them-
selves, 10 5 and that the total of the 74% who default and the 22% who
consent to judgment in full approximates the default judgment rate in
other cities. The District of Columbia's system of not requiring a con-
sumer defendant in a case involving less than $2000 to file a written
answer is surely to be applauded, but it does not enable a larger percent-
age of defendants to prevail.
What is missing from this picture is lawyers. Lawyers are profes-
sionally trained to spot defenses, such as those possibly available to
these defendants. Lawyers know how to present defenses to opposing
counsel in negotiations and to a judge if negotiations fail. None of the
fifteen respondents had discussed their cases with an attorney, even
though each of them was a party to formal litigation. Six of them had
thought of getting an attorney to assist them. Three of them told us that
they abandoned the effort because AFC told them that, their cases hav-
ing been discontinued, obtaining an attorney was not necessary. Two
could not take time off from work to locate, consult, and attend court
with an attorney. One defendant said that she telephoned an attorney
but that he never returned her call. The other nine interviewees did not
even think about getting a lawyer. Four thought that they could help
themselves, four thought that they didn't have enough money and didn't
know about free legal services, 10 6 and one had no idea how to find out
105. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
106. The District of Columbia has a federally-financed legal services program, but
stretching its income eligibility guidelines to the limit, it cannot serve an individual with an
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anything about attorneys.
If our results are representative - and here we stress that we would
very much like to see our study replicated 10 7 - our system ofjustice has
failed for this class of litigants. 10 8 In that event, we can identify two
approaches to reform. Both proceed from the assumption that the de-
fault rate would drop if consumer defendants with plausible defenses
knew that they had a chance in court. Of course, most of our interview-
ees said that they defaulted for reasons unrelated to the merits, such as
being told that the case had been discontinued, or the cost of missing
work. But we think that either of our suggested approaches could over-
come misleading advice against appearing in court, and we suspect that
awareness that it is possible to win one's case would, at least in some
cases, overcome the defendant's presumption that his or her economic
self-interest lay in a default.
One approach would provide some degree of legal assistance to
consumer defendants. The other would attempt to circumvent the need
for legal assistance. Under the first approach, a publicly paid official
would attempt to contact, educate, and offer to speak for consumer de-
fendants. 10 9 The official would be a law student or paralegal assis-
income of more than $10,818 or a family of four with an income of more than $21,843.
Telephone interview with attorney Stephanie Forrester, District of Columbia Neighbor-
hood Legal Services, by Philip G. Schrag, August 4, 1989. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611 (1988).
Half of the interviewees had incomes over $20,000, see Table I, supra, and therefore ap-
proximately half of them would not have been eligible for free assistance even if they had
known of the existence of the legal services program.
107. Ideally, the study should be replicated by professionally trained interviewers who
contact a larger sample of defendants. But as Professor Philip Shuchman has noted, in
private correspondence with us, a substantial degree of validation could be obtained if
each of several sets of law students, in various cities, administered the questionnaire to 15
or 20 appropriately selected defaulting defendants. These small-scale replications could
be sponsored by law school clinics or seminars in social science methodology, municipal
departments of consumer affairs, or by the attorney generals of several states. Of course,
the questionnaire would have to be modified to reflect the consumer protection law of the
jurisdiction in which the survey was being conducted.
108. It could be argued, of course, that there is nothing wrong with systematic failure
for a class of litigants, so long as the system as a whole is adequate. For example, the
reforms that we propose will cost money. The costs could be borne by the taxpayers, or
they could be passed on to creditors through increased filing fees in collection cases, and
presumably through them to all buyers of merchandise. Either way, the public would pay
more so that consumer defendants had a better chance of invoking the rights available
under decisional and statutory law. As supporters of the traditional model of due process,
we favor this trade-off, but society may prefer to keep taxes or prices low and to tolerate
large numbers of debt collection cases in which the defendants either default or, because
they do not know their rights, appear in court but agree to whatever the creditor demands.
We suggest that if the public really does not expect defenses such as unconscionability to
be raised, it should repeal the consumer protection statutes rather than make a pretense at
consumer justice by providing many legal rights that are almost never asserted.
109. If desired, this system could include an initial screening so that only defendants
with incomes under a certain level would be assisted. The authors believe, however, that
screening is inappropriate because virtually all consumer defendants are indigent in the
sense that they cannot obtain legal help with their cases in the ordinary way; few if any
lawyers will agree to defend a case involving a few hundred dollars for a fee that is only a
fraction of the amount in controversy, and few defendants will be willing to pay a fee of,
say, $3000 to defend a $500 case just for the sake of principle.
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tant1 I0 employed by the court itself, a legal services organization, or a
government agency independent of the court. The official would begin
by using information in the file regarding the defendant's home or work
telephone numbers, but if the file did not include such numbers, the
creditor would be obligated (perhaps through counsel) to supply the of-
ficial with any numbers it had on record. If no telephone number could
be ascertained, the official would contact the defendant by mail at the
address at which service had been made and any other known addresses,
and suggest that the defendant call the official.
Once contact was made, the official would explain his or her role in
the process. He or she would tell the consumer that collection suits can
sometimes be defended and might provide the latest annual statistics on
the percentage of litigated non-default cases in which defendants ob-
tained partial or full relief from the creditor's claim. The official would
explain to the consumer the kinds of defenses that the law recognizes
(including an explanation of plausible types of defenses not yet tested in
the courts). By telephone, he or she would administer a questionnaire
like ours, in order to help the defendant ascertain whether the case was
worth defending. Finally, he or she would offer to help the defendant to
marshall evidence; e.g., by looking over the contract documents and re-
ceipts, by ordering them properly, by taking photographs of any defects
in the merchandise, by presenting documentary and witness evidence in
court, by making proper objections to the creditor's testimony, by con-
ducting cross-examination, and, of course, by representing the defend-
ant in any negotiation with the creditor.
Our alternate proposal would dispense with the new personnel; it
would aim to educate the defendant to evaluate defenses and to repre-
sent himself or herself more effectively in court. Under this plan, every
summons served on a consumer defendant would have to have stapled
to it a rather lengthy but clearly written brochure explaining the nature
of the court in which the proceeding was being brought, the procedure
used there, and the law of consumer cases. It would describe, in lan-
guage understandable to a person who had no more than a high school
education, the common defenses such as payment, breaches of warranty,
unconscionability, and violations of the local deceptive practices and dis-
closure laws. It would give the consumer a kind of checklist, so that the
transaction in question (and any subsequent debt collection contacts)
could be evaluated, and it could encourage the consumer to go to court
if the checklist revealed defenses. It might describe some recent prece-
dents in which consumer defendants had prevailed with these defenses.
Under this system, judges would have to be more open to informal
110. Under this proposal, most courts would have to modify their rules to permit in-
court practice by paralegals or by students working for the court or an agency (as opposed
to those in clinical law school courses, for whom most court rules have already been
changed). We see no great difficulty with this change in the practice rules, since within
days, the paralegals or students would, by dint of repetitive practice, be more expert in
these proceedings than most lawyers are, and the court could require that they be ade-
quately supervised by an attorney in the agency through which they are paid.
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presentations of evidence, but many judges already allow considerable
procedural and evidentiary leeway to pro se litigants. This alternative
plan might not significantly help consumers with limited ability to read
or understand the printed materials, but it would be considerably less
expensive than providing personnel to assist each defendant.' l
Some might think that by telling consumer defendants what facts
constitute a legally sufficient defense, we would encourage fabrication of
those facts. We do not regard that objection as problematic. Elsewhere
in the legal system, we do not regard ignorance of the law as desirable;
for example, we do not discourage civil or criminal defendants from
consulting lawyers before making statements, nor do we make it unethi-
cal for lawyers to explain the law to their clients before learning the facts
of their cases. We ordinarily regard the right of opposing parties to tes-
tify, the use of cross-examination, and the penalty for perjury as suffi-
cient protections against lying.
We acknowledge that our proposals for increasing defendants' par-
ticipation rate would alter our conventional model of litigation. We nor-
mally regard the acquisition of legal advice as the individual problem of
any person affected by the court system. Even when we provide free
legal help to people, as in the case of civil legal services for poor people
or appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants, the first move in
the direction of obtaining such counsel must come from the litigants,
who are expected to seek out legal services or request appointed coun-
sel. We propose to thrust at least some legal information, and perhaps a
telephoned offer of help, in the direction of litigants who have not asked
for it. This may seem to some a drastic incursion on the freedom of
litigants to distance themselves completely from the legal process. In
our view, however, there is something quite troubling about a sector of
the legal system in which the great majority of defendants lose their
cases by default. If it is the case that a significant fraction of these de-
fendants do so out of ignorance that they actually possess legal defenses,
modifying our model of connecting litigants to legal advice may be
warranted.
I 1l. In another way, having an official reach out to the consumer defendants is also
superior to providing information with the summons. Two of our interviewees defaulted
because of nervousness in court or because they did not find the right courtroom at the
right time. Human assistance would probably have helped these two defendants more
than a piece of paper could have. Several defendants were apparently advised by the cred-
itor that the case had been discontinued. Written notice could advise defendants to be
wary of such claims, but a professional could verify whether cases had really been with-
drawn. Four interviewees claimed never to have received the summons; by definition, ad-
vice served with the summons could not have helped them, but a telephone call or letter
from an official would be an alternate method by which information is delivered. The
defendants who could not understand the significance of a summons would probably be
better assisted by an official than by a lengthy legal explanation, however clearly written.
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2. Would you let me ask you a few questions?
- If yes, go to question 3.
- If no, terminate interview.
3. What did you buy that led to this problem?
4. What was .the name of the persons or company you were sup-
posed to make payments to?
5. Are there any papers you have regarding the sale or the suit?
- May I see them?
6. Did you make several purchases, or just one?
- If several, were they at different times?
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE MERCHANDISE OR SERVICES
If this concerns at least some merchandise, go to question 7.
If no merchandise is involved, go to question 19.
7. Do you have the merchandise with you?
- If yes, may I see it?
8. Did the seller make any promises about the merchandise?
- If yes, ask questions 9 - 13.
- If no, go to question 14.
9. Did the seller say that the merchandise was new?
- If yes, do you think it was?
10. Did the seller say the merchandise was being sold at a discount?
- If yes, do you think it was?
11. Did the seller say it was made in a particular place?
- If yes, do you think it was made where the seller claimed?
12. Did the seller say that the merchandise had any special features?
- If yes, do you think it had those features?
13. Did the seller say what the merchandise was made of?
- If yes, do you think that it was made of that material?
14. Did the seller compare the merchandise with another seller's
goods?
- If yes, do you think that the seller was telling the truth?
15. Did the seller claim to have any special expertise or credentials?
- If yes, do you think that he/she was telling the truth?
16. Did the seller show you a sample of the product?
- If yes, what did the sample indicate about the merchandise?
17. Did the seller, in writing, claim that the merchandise may not per-
form in any particular way?
18. Were you dissatisfied with the merchandise?
- If yes, what complaints do you have?
- If the merchandise is available, determine what problems
listed above, and what other problems, look like reasonable
complaints.
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- If no services are involved, go to question 26.
19. Are there any promises that the seller made about the services
that he/she did not keep?
- If yes, ask questions 20 - 22.
- If no, go to question 23.
20. Did the seller claim that the services were of a special quality?
- If yes, did they have this quality?
21. Did the seller claim any special expertise to perform the services?
- If yes, did the seller have this expertise?
22. Did the seller compare the services with those of a competitor?
- If yes, were the comparisons accurate?
23. Did the seller say that the services were needed?
- Do you think that the services were needed?
24. Did the seller finish performing the services?
25. Did the seller perform any services that you did not want?
26. In your opinion, did the seller lie to you or mistreat you in any
other way?
III. THE SELLER'S METHOD OF GETTING THE SALE
27. How did you hear about the merchandise or services?
- Note the answer, then ask questions 28 - 29.
28. Have you seen any advertisements by the seller?
- If yes, ask questions 30 - 32.
29. Did a salesman come to your home, and did you agree to buy the
merchandise or services at your home?
- If yes, ask questions 33 - 38.
For Advertisements:
30. Did the dealer advertise in any misleading way?
- If yes, explain how.
31. Did the advertising condition the sale upon any requirements?
- If yes, describe the conditions and where they were located.
32. After you went to the seller, did he try to convince you to buy
something other than what was advertised?
- If yes, please describe what happened.
For Home Solicitation Sales:
33. Did you ever try to cancel the sale?
- If yes, ask questions 34 - 35.
- If no, go to question 36.
34. How did you try to cancel the sale?
35. Please describe the seller's response to your offer to cancel.
36. Did the seller give you a written agreement?
- If yes, may I see it?
- Ask questions 37 - 38.
- If no, go to question 39.
37. Is there [or do you recall] a statement appearing under the cap-
tion "BUYERS RIGHT TO CANCEL"?
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
38. Is there [or do you recall] a statement reading as follows: If this
agreement was solicited at or near your residence and you do not
want the goods or services, you may cancel this agreement by
mailing a notice to the seller. The notice must say that you do not
want the goods or services and must be mailed before midnight of
the third business day after you signed this agreement. The no-
tice must be mailed to [name and address of the seller].
IV. THE AGREEMENT "
39. Before you bought the item(s) or services, how much did you
think it (or they) would cost?
40. How much did the item(s) or services really cost?
41. Have you seen the item(s) or services elsewhere for a lower price?
42. How long did you think you had to pay this amount?
43. How long did you really have to pay this amount?
44. How much were you supposed to pay each month?
45. How much did you end up having to pay each month?
46. What interest rate did the seller say he/she would charge you?
47. What interest rate did you really have to pay?
48. Did you sign a contract?
- If yes, ask questions 49 - 55.
- If no, go to question 56.
49. Did the seller give you a chance to read the contract before you
signed it?
50. How much did the contract say you (or the other) had to pay?
51. How long did the contract give you to pay?
- Did you expect to have a longer time? If so, why?
52. May I borrow the contract and return it tomorrow?
- If yes, answer the questions later.
- If no, answer the following questions now.
(a) Describe the schedule of payments.
(b) Is there a clause providing for an assignment of
earnings?
(c) What kind of security interest is given?
(d) What kind of attorneys' fees are provided for?
(e) Does the contract include name, address, and phone
number of both the buyer and seller?
(f) Does the contract contain a description of the goods or
services purchased, including the trade name and model
number?
(g) If the goods were used, seconds, or damaged, does the
contract so specify?
(h) If the seller offered insurance, does the contract specify
whether the seller could benefit from the coverage?
(i) Is the contract contained in a single document?
(j) At the top of the first page, is there, in 12-point ex-
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trabold type, the words "RETAIL INSTALLMENT
CONTRACT"?
(k) If there is information on both sides of the page, do the
words "NOTICE: SEE OTHER SIDE FOR IMPOR-
TANT INFORMATION" appear on the first page in
boldface type, and do the words "THE TERMS OF
THIS CONTRACT ARE CONTAINED ON MORE
THAN ONE PAGE" appear on each page in boldface
type?
(1) Does the contract disclose the following:
(1) The cash price of the property or services
purchased?
(2) The sum of any amounts credited as down pay-
ment (including any trade-in)?
(3) The differences between the cash price (#1
above) and amount credited (#2 above)?
(4) All other charges, individually itemized, which are
included in the amount of credit extended but
which are not part of the finance charge?
(5) The total amount to be financed (#3 above +
#4 above)?
(6) The amount of the finance charge?
(7) The finance charge expressed as an annual per-
centage rate?
- Not required where finance charge either (a)
doesn't exceed $5 and is applicable to an
amount financed lower than $75, or (b)
doesn't exceed $7.50 and is applicable to an
amount financed higher than $75.
(8) The number, amount, and due dates or periods of
payments scheduled to repay the indebtedness?
(9) The default, delinquency, or similar charges paya-
ble in case of late payments?
(10) A description of any security interest held by the
creditor due to the extension of credit, and a clear
identification of the property to which the secur-
ity interest relates?
53. Did the seller deliver a legible and completed copy of the contract
before you got the goods?
54. Did you sign a promissory note in connection with the contract?
- If yes, does the promissory note state on its face that "THIS
INSTRUMENT IS SUBJECT TO A RETAIL INSTALL-
MENT CONTRACT?"
55. Did you make any cash payments?
- If yes, did you receive receipts for your payments?
56. Are there any other documents you signed?
- If yes, and if you can see them:
(a) Describe the documents and ask to borrow them.
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(b) Ask questions 57 - 64, then go to question 66.
- If no, or if they are unavailable, go to question 65.
57. If any of the disclosures inquired about in #52(1) were not made,
were those disclosures made in any of the other documents?
- If yes, describe the document and when it was received by the
consumer.
58. Is there any schedule of payments under which any installment,
except the down payment, is not equal or substantially equal, or
under which the intervals differ substantially?
- If yes, describe the schedule of payments.
59. Is there an acceleration provision?
- If yes, describe the grounds for acceleration.
60. Is there any provision where the buyer agrees not to assert a claim
or defense arising from the sale?
61. Is there a provision where the buyer allows the seller to enter on
his/her premises to repossess the collateral?
62. Is there a provision where the buyer waives a right of action re-
garding illegal acts in collecting payments or repossessing the
goods?
63' Is there a provision regarding collecting attorneys' fees incurred
in collecting the debt?
- If yes, describe the provision.
64. Is there a provision allowing seller to take possession of the
goods upon default without a provision waiving a deficiency
judgment?
- If yes, was this a sale of an automobile?
65. What do you remember about the other documents?
66. Every six months, did the seller send you a statement of accounts
listing the interest rate, amounts unpaid, charges, and the dollar
amount still to be paid?
- If no, was this an open-end credit plan?
67. Did the seller offer you money, rebates, or discounts if you would
help him/her find other buyers.
- If yes, please describe what the seller offered.
68. Did the seller require you to get property insurance before he/
she would give you credit?
69. Was this an open-end credit plan (was the answer to question 6
"several")?
- If yes, ask questions 70 - 71.
- If no, go to question 72.
70. Did the seller disclose the following:
(a) If the goods were used, seconds, or damaged, did the seller
disclose this at the time of sale on a receipt?
(b) The conditions under which a finance charge may be
imposed?
(c) The method of determining the balance upon which a fi-
nance charge will be imposed?
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(d) The method of determining the amount of the finance
charge, including any minimum or fixed amount imposed?
(e) If periodic rates are imposed, did the seller disclose each
rate, the range of balances to which it is applicable, and the
corresponding nominal annual percentage rate?
(f) The average effective annual percentage rate of return, or a
projected rate of return?
(g) The conditions under which any other charges may be im-
posed, and the methods by which they are determined?
(h) The conditions under which the creditor may take a security
interest, and a description of the interest?
(i) If the seller provided for insurance coverage, did the seller
disclose that he/she may benefit from the coverage?
71. For each billing cycle, where there's an outstanding balance or a
finance charge imposed, did the creditor transmit a statement set-
ting forth each of the following items to the extent applicable:
(a) The outstanding balance in the account at the beginning of
the statement period?
(b) The amount and date of each extension of credit during the
period, and, if a purchase was involved, a brief identification
(unless previously furnished) of the goods or services
purchased?
(c) The total amount credited to the account during the period?
(d) The amount of any finance charge added to the account dur-
ing the period, itemized to show the amounts (if any) due to
the application of percentage rates and the amount (if any)
imposed as a minimum or fixed charge?
(e) If periodic rates are used to compute the finance charge,
each rate, the range of balances to which it is applicable, and
the corresponding nominal annual percentage rate?
(f) Where the total finance charge exceeds 50 cents per month
or period longer than a month, the annual percentage rate?
(g) The average effective annual percentage rate of return?
(h) The balance upon which the finance charge was computed
and a statement of how the balance was determined?
(i) The outstanding balance in the account at the end of the
period?
(j) The date by which, or the period within which, payment
must be made to avoid additional finance charges?
V. MISSED PAYMENTS
72. Did you miss any payments?
- If yes, ask questions 73 - 75.
- If no, go to question 76.
73. Why did you miss any payment or payments?
- List all reasons personal to the consumer, and all reasons re-
lating to distress about the transaction.
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74. Within thirty days after you failed to pay, did the seller:
(a) Require the entire balance to be paid?
(b) Bring an action against you?
(c) Try to get any collateral?
75. Within thirty days after you failed to pay, did you try to make your
payment?
- If yes, describe the seller's response.
VI. COLLECTING THE DEBT
76. Other than by suing you, did the seller make any efforts to collect
the money?
- If yes, ask questions 77 - 81.
- If no, go to question 82.
77. Did the seller or someone acting on the seller's behalf try to co-
erce or threaten you in any way?
- If yes, please describe what he/she did.
78. Did the seller or someone acting on the seller's behalf unreasona-
bly oppress, harass, or abuse anybody?
- If yes, please describe what he/she did.
79. Did the seller or someone acting on the seller's behalf unreasona-
bly publicize information about you or your debts?
- If yes, please describe what he/she did.
80. Did the seller or someone acting on the seller's behalf use any
fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading methods to collect the debt
or get information?
- If yes, please describe what he/she did.
81. In your opinion, did the seller or someone acting on the seller's
behalf collect or use any other unfair methods to collect the debt?
- If yes, please describe what he/she did.
VII. LAY AWAY PLANS
82. Did you buy the goods on lay away?
- If yes, ask questions 83 - 90.
- If no, go to question 91.
83. Did the seller, clearly and in writing, state the schedule of
payments?
84. Did the seller, clearly and in writing, state that the goods will be
held by seller and returned to you within 14 days of final
payment?
85. Did the seller, clearly and in writing, state all refund and ex-
change policies?
86. Did the seller, clearly and in writing, state his right to deduct late
charges?
87. Did the seller, clearly and in writing, state that you will receive a
written statement and receipts regarding all payments you make?
88. Did you try to cancel the lay away plan within two weeks of the
sale?
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If yes, what was the seller's response?
89. Was the seller unable to give you the goods or their exact
duplicate?
- If yes, what did the seller do?
90. What kind of fees did the seller charge you?
VIII. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSACTIONS
If the transaction did not involve a motor vehicle, go to question
122.
91. Did you receive a contract or invoice?
- If yes, ask questions 92 - 102.
- If no, go to question 103.
92. What kind of information was itemized on the first page of the
contract, and how are the captions laid out and typed?
93. Does the contract or invoice bear the certification that all re-
quired information is true?
94. Do the last name and license numbers of each salesperson in-
volved in the sale appear on the contract or invoice?
95. Does the first page of the contract have space for the signatures of
the buyer and seller?
96. Are the printed portions in 8-point type?
97. On the first page of the contract, is the following notice printed
or typed in boldface no smaller than 14-point on the first page:
NOTICE TO PURCHASER: IT IS AGAINST THE LAW FOR
THE SELLER TO PERMIT OR REQUEST YOU TO SIGN THIS
DOCUMENT BEFORE ALL BLANKS ABOVE HAVE BEEN FIL-
LED IN BY THE SELLER AND HE HAS SIGNED THIS PAPER
CERTIFYING THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS
CORRECT.
98. Describe any statement of insurance coverage.
99. Was the original invoice delivered at the time of the sale?
100. Was a copy of the contract given to you when you signed the se-
curity agreement?
101. Did the seller request any amounts in excess of the amounts in
the contract?
102. Describe any waiver provisions in the contract.
103. Did the seller require you to buy insurance?
- If yes, describe the coverage and the payments required.
104. How much was the finance charge?
105. Describe the schedule of payments.
106. Did the seller charge you for a warranty or a guarantee?
107. Did you receive receipts for all your cash payments?
108. Did the seller take the car away?
- If yes, ask questions 109 - 119.
- If no, go to question 120.
109. Did you try to get the car back by paying for it?
- If yes, ask questions 110 - 111.
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- If no, go to question 112.
110. When did you try to get it back?
111. What did you try to pay the seller for the car?
112. Describe how the seller got the car.
113. If the cash price of the car was $2000 or less, did the seller try to
get the unpaid balance after he/she took the property?
114. How much do you think you could have sold the car for?
115. Did you damage the car in any way?
116. Did you refuse to give the seller the car?
117. Did the seller indicate that failure to make payment could result
in harm to yourself or your property?
118. Within 5 days of the repossession, did you get a notice?
- If yes, what did the notice contain?
119. Did you try to get the car back?
120. Did the salesperson show you an identification card?
121. Did you ever try to pay the balance early?
- If yes, please describe your efforts.
IX. THE DEFAULT
122. Did you know that you were being sued before the case came up
in court?
- If yes, ask questions 123 - 140.
- If no, go to question 141.
123. How did you find out?
124. Note whether the answer to question 123 differs from the affidavit
of service in the file.
125. What did you think was happening to you?
126. Did you go to court on the day specified in the court paper?
- If yes, ask question 127 and go to question 140.
- If no, go to question 128.
127. Tell me what happened in court.
128. Please tell me all your reasons for not showing up to court.
129. Did you think that the court action was cancelled?
- If yes, ask questions 130 - 132.
- If no, go to question 133.
130. Did you think that you settled the case?
131. Were you advised by anybody not to go to court?
- If yes, who told you that?
132. What else made you think that the court action was cancelled?
133. Were you unable to go because of illness?
134. Were you reluctant to lose a day's pay from work?
135. Did you forget about going to court?
136. Did you think that you had no defenses?
137. Did you receive the summons too late to go to court?
138. Were you afraid to go to court?
139. Would it have been too difficult to travel to the court building?
140. Could you read and understand the summons?
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141. Do you think that the seller had a right to bring a court action
against you and ask for money from you?
- If no, why not?
142. Do you think that you lost in court?
143. Did you ever think that you might have won in court?
144. Did you ever think about getting a lawyer to help you?
- If yes, why didn't you?
- If no, why not?
X. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSUMER
145. Note obvious characteristics of consumer.
(a) Note ethnicity.
(b) Note gender.
(c) Note any language difficulty.
(d) Note any obvious infirmity.
146. How old are you?
147. Are you employed?
- If so, what is your job and employer?
148. In which of the following ranges does your annual income fall?
(a) 0- 5,000.
(b) 5,000 - 10,000.
(c) 10,000 - 15,000.
(d) 15,000 - 20,000.
(e) 20,000 - 25,000.
(f) 25,000 - 30,000.
(g) over 30,000.
149. What grade did you complete in school?
(a) 5th grade or below.
(b) 6th - 8th grade.
(c) 9th - 12th grade.
(d) College graduate.
(e) Graduate or professional school.
150. How many people are in your household?
- How old are they?
- Are any of them working?
151. Is there a phone number I can reach you at in case I have any
further questions?

